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University Regulation of Student Speech:

Considering Content-Based Criteria Under
Public Forum and Subsidy Doctrines
Elizabeth E. Gordont
In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
extends to universities 1 and university students,2 but cautioned,
however, that these rights must be applied "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." s These "special characteristics" allow universities to exercise a certain amount of discretion in making "educational" decisions. As a result, a university
has a certain leeway to choose how best to pursue its unique educational mission.4 This Comment addresses the question of
whether this limited discretion over educational choices allows a
university to consider some content-based criteria in making decisions regarding student speech without violating the strict nondiscrimination standards of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.5
Part I of this Comment discusses the two most relevant methods of analyzing university treatment of student speech: the forum
doctrine and the subsidy doctrine. Part II presents two paradigms
to illustrate the current state of the law pertaining to university
recognition of student groups and university funding of student
groups.6 The first paradigm, referred to as the recognition paradigm, explores what, if any, content-based criteria a university may
t A.B. 1987, Brown University; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.

I "University" will refer in this Comment to public universities only, unless otherwise
specified, due to the "state action doctrine." Constitutional guarantees of individual rights
are effective only against action that is "fairly attributable to the state." Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 937 (1982). The reasoning contained herein, however, should be
useful when applied to private colleges and universities as well.
See Healy v James, 408 US 169, 180 (1972) ("[W]e note that state colleges and universities are not immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.").
3 Id at 180, citing with approval Tinker v Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 US
503, 507 (1969).
' See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 268 n 5 (1981).
8 Under the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom
of speech," US Const, Amend I. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." US Const, Amend XIV.
6 Recognition and funding cases are discussed because they are among the most common types of cases on the topic of university treatment of student speech. A related situa-
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consider in deciding whether to extend official recognition 7 to a
student group. Similarly, the second paradigm, referred to as the
funding paradigm, analyzes what, if any, content-based criteria a
university may consider in deciding how to allocate funds among
student groups.
This Comment concludes that a university may indeed consider educational content in making decisions regarding student
speech without violating the Constitution. In the context of a public university, the forum doctrine's otherwise strict nondiscriminatory standard is relaxed in deference to the university's discretion
in pursuing its unique educational mission. The relaxation of the
forum doctrine, while evident in recognition cases, is most fully
demonstrated in funding cases, where its content-based nondiscrimination standards become coextensive with the subsidy doctrine's normally less rigorous, viewpoint-based nondiscrimination
standards. Universities, therefore, may legally exercise greater discretion in their treatment of student speech than is commonly
thought.
I.

DOCTRINES USED TO ANALYZE UNIVERSITY REGULATION OF
STUDENT SPEECH

A. The Forum Doctrine'
Courts have traditionally analyzed university regulation of
student speech under the forum doctrine.' The forum doctrine
draws on the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to limit
state authority to control speech in state-created public fora. As
Professor Laurence Tribe writes:
[T]he public forum doctrine holds that restrictions on
speech should be subject to higher scrutiny when, all
other things being equal, that speech occurs in areas
playing a vital role in communication-such as in those
tion which this Comment does not address is the university relationship with student

presses.
7 For greater elaboration of what official recognition includes, see note 47 and accompanying text.

' The forum doctrine has been the subject of multiple scholarly articles, many pointing
out its inconsistencies and lack of clarity. This Comment focuses narrowly on the forum
doctrine in the context of public university regulation of student speech and will not address its other applications.
9 For more thorough discussions of the public forum doctrine, see Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 S Ct Rev 1; Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana,
1974 S Ct Rev 233; Comment, Public Forum Analysis After Perry, 54 Fordham L Rev 545
(1986).
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places historically associated with First. Amendment
activities. 10

Courts traditionally defined public fora as the physical sites where
public communication was likely to take place," but they have recently broadened the definition to focus on the manner of commu12
nication itself, not just its particular location.
Once the state creates a public forum by establishing public
channels of communication, it must take great care to regulate the
expressive activity therein in a nondiscriminatory, content-neutral
fashion to avoid violating the Free Speech and Assembly Clauses
of the First Amendment." If the state, operating in a public forum
such as a university, denies to one group the recognition it extends
to others based solely on the content of that group's speech, courts
will order the state to extend equal recognition to the excluded
group."' "Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
o Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw § 12-24 at 987 (Foundation Press,

2d ed 1988).
" The Court described public fora in Food Employees Union v Logan Valley Plaza,
391 US 308 (1968) as "streets, sidewalks, parks and other similar public places [which] are
so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them
for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." Id at 315.
For example, in Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense and EducationalFund, Inc., 473
US 788 (1985), a charitable fundraising drive among government employees was described
as a forum, although the Court concluded that it was nonpublic. "[T]he extent to which the
Government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic." Id at
797. This Comment is concerned only with public fora, since state universities are considered public or at least semi-public fora. In perhaps the most abstract description of fora, the
First Circuit recently concluded that "fora are channels of communication." Student Gov't
Ass'n v University of Massachusetts, 868 F2d 473, 476 (1st Cir 1989).
"s The Supreme Court expressly prohibited any content-based regulation of speech in a
public forum in Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92 (1972). The Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting picketing on a public way within 150 feet of a school,
except for peaceful labor picketing. The Court objected to the regulation as follows:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a
school's labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing
is prohibited. . . . [A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.. . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say.
408 US at 95-96. See also Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 461-63 (1980).
In Healy, 408 US 169, the Supreme Court ordered a state-supported college to recognize a student group which had been denied recognition because the college president disagreed with the left-wing political views the group espoused. Also, in Widmar, 454 US 263, a
state university that made its facilities generally available for the activities of registered
student groups was ordered to make its facilities similarly available to a registered student
group seeking to engage in religious worship and discussion.

396

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1991:

based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to
' If the state denies all groups official recognition,
content alone."15
likely resulting in denial of access to facilities for group purposes,
this denial would be sufficiently nondiscriminatory to be constitutional.16 But when the state creates a public forum by allowing access and recognition to some, it may not then exclude others based
on the content of their speech.1 7 Some universities have deliberately chosen to avoid the discrimination problem by not recognizing or supporting any student groups.18 This is one extreme solution that satisfies the burden of nondiscriminatory treatment of
speech.
Although the state may not regulate speech in a public forum
based upon content, it may place reasonable time, place or manner
restrictions on that speech. 9 These restrictions, however, must be
drawn very narrowly. Furthermore, time, place or manner restrictions are subject to close judicial scrutiny to ensure that they are
not abused so as to camouflage restrictions on speech itself. 20 The

Supreme Court upholds such restrictions only if they "are content
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."21 For example, a university may not forbid all leaflet distri"

Mosley, 408 US at 96.

" See Comment, Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University Discretion, 55 U Chi L Rev 363, 369 (1988). See also Tribe, § 2-4 n 5 (cited in note 10)
who suggests "[a] better solution might well be to require ideological activities . . . to be
financed from voluntary contributions ...." Although Tribe's comment comes in the context of compelled funding of labor union activities by their members, it is equally applicable
here.
" See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267-68 (1981), citing Madison Joint School Dist.
v Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 US 167, 175 & n 8 (1976):
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a
forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University
has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required
to create the forum in the first place" (emphasis added).
18 See David L. Meabon, Robert E. Alexander and Katherine E. Hunter, Student Activity Fees 19-33 (National Entertainment and Campus Activities Association, 1979).
"* "We have continually recognized that reasonable 'time, place and manner' regulations . . . may be necessary to further significant governmental interests." Mosley, 408 US
at 98, citing Cox v New Hampshire, 312 US 569, 575-76 (1941); Poulos v New Hampshire,
345 US 395, 398 (1953); Cox v Louisiana,379 US 559 (1965); Adderley v Florida,385 US 39,
46-48 (1966).
20 For further discussion, see Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak and J. Nelson Young,
Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance and Procedure § 20.47 at 235-38 (West, 1986).
" United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 177 (1983), quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 US 37, 45 (1983).
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bution in order to prevent littering, because narrower, less drastic
methods 'exist to combat the actual littering without severely curtailing expressive activity."
Because public universities function in part as important centers of communication, they constitute public fora, although there
remains some debate as to degree. The Supreme Court stated in
Widmar v Vincent that "the campus of a public university, at least
for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public
forum. ' 23 Some courts argue that due to its educational mission

and primary duty to its students, as opposed to the public at large,
a university is only a limited purpose or semi-public forum. A
semi-public forum might logically be held to a lower level of scrutiny than a full traditional forum in discriminating among forms of
speech. 4 Under either categorization, however, this Comment argues that a university is entitled-to greater discretion in its regulation of speech than a more generalized public forum, such as a
park, because of the university's unique educational mission. 25
B. The Subsidy Doctrine
The second approach to analyzing university regulation of student speech is the subsidy doctrine. The forum doctrine and the
subsidy doctrine each derive from a distinct premise. The forum
doctrine presumes a state duty to recognize all speech equally. The
subsidy doctrine, by contrast, presumes that the state is not obligated to subsidize First Amendment rights.
The central theme of the subsidy analysis is stated in Harris v
McRae: "[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the
path of a [person's] exercise of . . .freedom of [speech], it need
" See Schneider v State, 308 US 147 (1939), which bars a city, as a branch of the state,
from prohibiting distribution of leaflets.
' Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267 n 5 (1981); accord Healy v James, 408 US 169,
180 (1979).
The Perry Court divided fora into three categories: traditional public fora, limited
purpose public fora, and nonpublic fora. The right of the state to limit expressive activity is
"sharply circumscribed" in traditional public fora, less circumscribed in the limited purpose
fora, and least restricted in nonpublic fora. See Perry, 460 US at 45-47. Although Perry held
that school mail facilities were nonpublic fora, the court suggested that "university meeting
facilities" would constitute limited purpose public fora, and so belong in Perry's second
category. Id at 45, citing Widmar, 454 US 263. See Tribe, § 12-24 at 987 (cited in note 10),
for a similar analysis of the Perry dicta.
" While this Comment seeks to avoid entering directly into a debate over the categorization of public universities as full public or semi-public fora, this analysis supports the
latter view.
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not remove those not of its own creation." 6 This echoes the
Court's previous rejection of the notion "that First Amendment
rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by
the State. '2 7 The subsidy cases 28 provide a strong argument
against mandatory funding of all student speech. In a situation
analogous to the student group funding setting, the Supreme Court
held in Regan v Taxation with Representation ("TWR") 29 that an
organization seeking funding from the federal government does not
have an absolute right to receive funding simply because the government funds other organizations. In TWR, a nonprofit corporation, organized to promote public interest in federal taxation,30 argued that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code3 1 violated the
First Amendment by limiting the tax payers' ability to deduct contributions made to organizations ,which engage in substantial lobbying efforts. The Court upheld the Internal Revenue Code provision by distinguishing between penalizing an organization based on
its activities and refusing to subsidize activities with public funds.
The TWR Court concluded that "Congress is not required by the
First Amendment to subsidize lobbying," 2 and reaffirmed its reasoning in Cammarano, stating that "[t]his Court has never held
that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a
3' 3
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.
The TWR Court added two caveats to its ruling. First, the
state may refuse to subsidize speech only if in so doing it does not
infringe upon. that freedom.34 This suggests that the state should

26448 US 297, 316 (1980). For :athorough summary of the Court's subsidy reasoning,
see Regan v Taxation With Representation, 461 US 540, 549-50 (1983).
" Cammarano v United States, 358 US 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas concurring). In Cammarano, the Supreme Court upheld legislation that disallowed a business deduction for federal income tax of sums spent for lobbying activities, concluding such a deduction was not
constitutionally mandated, and was "not 'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Id
at 513, citing Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 519 (1958).
"BThe following cases are often referred to as "the subsidy cases": Speiser, 357 US 513
(state has burden of proof under due process for denial of tax exemption based on individual's speech); Cammarano, 358 US 498 (income tax deductions not required for funds expended on lobbying); Maher v Roe, 432 US 464 (1977) (state may refuse to fund abortions
that are not medically necessary); Harris, 448 US 297 (states not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable); Regan v Taxation With Representation,461 US 540 (federal government may deny tax exempt status for
groups who lobby).
'9 461 US 540 (1983).
30 Id at 541-42.
"' 26 USC § 501(c)(3) (1982).
" 461 US at 546.
33 Id at 545. See also Cammarano, 358 US 498.
3, TWR, 461 US at 553 (Blackmun concurring).
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distinguish between less effective expression of speech due to
budgetary constraints, such as less lobbying by TWR and actual
suppression of speech, such as forbidding TWR to lobby, which
would infringe on its right to free speech. 5 Second, the state may
refuse to subsidize free speech only if it is not discriminating
against a certain viewpoint.3 6 For example, the state may not refuse to fund TWR's lobbying if its purpose is to prevent the expression of TWR's particular stance on tax issues. In TWR, the
content of TWR's speech is the lobbying; the viewpoint of TWR's
speech is the position for which they are lobbying. The rationale
behind the TWR caveats has long been present in-First Amendment scholarship, but was not previously delineated in this
context.
The distinction between content and viewpoint is subtle, but
very important.3 7 Court opinions often use the words interchangeably, a practice that has bred confusion. "Viewpoint" is perhaps
best understood as a subset of "content." The following example
illustrates the difference between the two, and its importance in
First Amendment jurisprudence. University A chooses not to fund
any political student group. All University A political student
groups are denied funding based on the political content of their
speech. University A's policy will likely survive Constitutional
scrutiny because it treats all political groups equally; Fascists,
Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists
alike are all barred from university funding. Meanwhile, University
B refuses to fund any political group that advocates the overthrow
of the current government. University B's policy allows funding of
centrist political groups, but bans funding of groups on the far
right and far left of the political spectrum. University B's policy
will not survive Constitutional scrutiny because it treats political
student groups unequally, discriminating among their individual
political viewpoints.
A content-based speech regulation is more acceptable to the
First Amendment than a viewpoint-based speech regulation because it is broader. Although a broader regulation affects more

88 The Court draws this distinction: "Although TWR does not have as much money as

it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution 'does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom.'" Id at 550, citing Harris, 448 US at 318.
86 Id at 548.
37

For a more comprehensive discussion of the content and viewpoint distinction, see

Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev

189 (1983).
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speech, it affects all speech within a certain category equally, so
that the threat of state promotion of one view over another is minimized. In contrast, a viewpoint-based regulation affects a narrower
category of speech, but is more objectionable to the First Amendment because it expresses a state bias. In the above example, University B's rule implements a state preference for status quo political speech.
Careful scrutiny of seemingly content-based regulation is required to ensure that it is not, in fact, viewpoint-based. In Gay
and Lesbian Student Ass'n v Gohn, ("GLSA"), 8 the student senate passed a rule that prohibited funding for any group organized
around sexual preference.3 9 Although neutral on its face, the rule is
substantively discriminatory because the Gay and Lesbian Student
Association was the only such group on campus. The rule was objectionable because, although content-based on its face, its deliberate effect was viewpoint-based.40
The subsidy doctrine's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination, the "subset", places fewer restrictions on government regulation than the forum doctrine's prohibition of content discrimination, the "full set". In TWR, the Supreme Court upheld legislation
that denied TWR a tax preference based on the content of its
speech (lobbying). If that legislation had denied TWR a tax preference based on the particular viewpoint expressed through lobbying-against federal tax laws-while allowing a tax preference for
similar lobbying groups based on their viewpoint-in support of
federal tax laws-the legislation would have been disallowed for
unconstitutionally discriminating against TWR's particular viewpoint. Thus, the subsidy doctrine allows content-based discrimination but not viewpoint discrimination.
The forum doctrine, in contrast, allows neither content-based
discrimination nor viewpoint-based discrimination. For example, in
Widmar v Vincent,4 1 a state university was not allowed to deny a
student group access to school facilities based on the religious content of the group's speech. Under the forum doctrine, the university would not be able to discriminate against that group based on
its pro-religion or anti-religion viewpoint. Thus, while the subsidy
doctrine prohibits only viewpoint discrimination, the forum doc-

850 F2d 361 (8th Cir 1988).
" Id at 364.
40 The rule was subsequently vetoed by the student government president, who objected to it as discriminatory. Id.
4" 454 US 263 (1981).
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trine , prohibits both content-based and viewpoint-based
discrimination.
The core difference between the two doctrines is the level of
scrutiny that the state's actions must undergo in terms of being
nondiscriminatory. Under the forum doctrine, the state's actions as
regulator of public speech in a public forum are subject to a standard of "absolute neutrality." 2 Under the subsidy doctrine, a
state's decision not to subsidize free speech is acceptable so long as
it does not violate the two caveats set forth in TWR: it must not
infringe upon freedom of speech and it must not enforce a viewpoint discrimination. 3
The subsidy and forum doctrines usually apply to separate situations; subsidy cases involve government allocation of scarce resources, while forum cases involve issues of free speech in public
fora. The two overlap, however, in the context of university funding of student speech. This overlap suggests that in the funding
context, universities may make content-based decisions if they do
not violate the two TWR caveats. In GLSA,4 s the Eighth Circuit
held that university discretion is narrowly limited to situations
where the university's motive for its action is acceptable. This
Comment suggests that one legitimate motive for denial of funds is
concern that a group's speech lacks educational content. In this
narrow range, when their motives concern educational content,
universities should enjoy the same discretion in their funding decisions as the TWR Court gave to Congress.
II.

PARADIGMATIC RECOGNITION AND FUNDING SITUATIONS: How
THE FORUM AND SUBSIDY DOCTRINES APPLY IN PRACTICE

This part analyzes what content-based criteria the university
may consider in deciding whether to recognize or fund student
groups. The analysis examines two hypothetical paradigms. The
first hypothetical is a recognition paradigm. Courts have generally
applied the forum doctrine to recognition cases. The second hypothetical is a funding paradigm. Courts have applied either the fo" See earlier discussion at notes 19-22 and accompanying text. See also Laurence H.
Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw U L Rev 237 (1978).
" "Unlike the public forum rules which prohibit broad content-based exclusions, the
rule governing funding allocations merely prohibits discrimination against particular viewpoints." Comment, 55 U Chi L Rev at 388 (cited in note 16).
" See Student Gov't Ass'n v University of Massachusetts, 868 F2d 473, 480 (1st Cir

1989), which more generally recognizes "that there is some overlap between the two doctrines because in maintaining forums the state indirectly subsidizes private speech."
" 850 F2d 361. See note 71 for a fuller description of GLSA.
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rum doctrine or subsidy reasoning to funding cases, with substantially the same result.
A. The Recognition Paradigm" e
In the first hypothetical, a student group seeks official recognition from University X. Assume University X has established a forum by making a practice of recognizing student organizations. Assume also that such recognition includes the right to conduct
group meetings in campus facilities, the right to use campus bulletin boards, and special student group use of the school newspaper. ' All of these rights may loosely be described as involving access to existing school resources, since none of these require a
specific allocation of additional university funds to the group. Assume further that the group has made proper application for this
recognition in the manner prescribed by University X."5 The question is whether there are any constitutionally acceptable reasons
for University X to deny recognition to the student group.
First, University X must justify any such exclusion by demonstrating that the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."9 University X may not exclude the student group based solely on a desire not to support religious speech. In Widmar, the Court held
that state interest in complying with the Establishment Clause
may be characterized as compelling. But it further held, however,
that an "equal access" policy inclusive of "religious" groups would
be compatible with that Clause. 0 Thus, because recognizing religious groups along with other student groups does not violate the
4' The first paradigm is based on Healy v James, 408 US 169 (1972), which is typical of
cases brought by students who have been denied official recognition by their university.
"7 These are typical benefits of recognition, see Healy, 408 US 169. See also Gay and
Lesbian Students Ass'n v Gohn, 656 F Supp 1045 (W D Ark 1987), for a similar list of
benefits.
8 In Healy, the Court noted that student groups may be required to comply fully with
reasonable application procedures, including full disclosure of the group's purpose.
'9 See Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 461, 464-65 (1980), cited with approval in Widmar,
454 US at 270. See also Healy, 408 US at 188-89.
50 The Court in Widmar reasoned that because the university forum recognized a broad

range of expression, both secular and religious, the primary effect of the forum would not be
the advancement of religion. Furthermore, the student handbook already noted that the
university's name would not be identified in any way with the opinions of any organization

or its members. Thus, the Court concluded that recognition of the religious group would not
in itself violate the Establishment Clause. The Court went on to conclude that the state's
interest in achieving greater separation of church and "state than is already ensured under
the Establishment Clause is not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based discrimination against the religious speech of the group in question. 454 US at 275-76.
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Establishment Clause, University X may not rely on an Establishment Clause defense for refusing to recognize -a religious group.
University X similarly may not exclude the student group
solely on a desire not to support a political viewpoint. In Healy,
,the Court held that disagreement with the political position espoused by a student group is insufficient justification for that
group's exclusion.'
Finally, University X may not exclude a student group from
recognition and its associated privileges5 2 based on the sexual preference of the group's members.5 3
University X may, however, exclude the student group if the
group's activities infringe upon "reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education. ' 5 4 Here, courts have repeatedly left open -the door to constitutional exclusion based on a
loosely-defined "content-based" distinction. Here too, the Supreme
Court has suggested that a university may constitutionally distinguish among student groups without resorting to randomizing efforts, such as a lottery, or a complete lack of support for all student groups. The Court leaves this door open because of what it
perceives to be the uniqueness of the university mission:
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters.
A university's mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatiblewith that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities. 55
" 408 US at 187-88.
Recognition may include the right to use campus facilities for communication, being
listed in university publications, and the right to apply for, not the right to receive, financial
aid. Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v Gohn, 850F2d 361; 362 (8th Cir 1988).
" See Healy, 408 US 169; GLSA, 850 F2d 361; Gay Lib v University of Missouri, 558
F2d 848 (8th Cir 1977); Gay Alliance of Students v Matthews, 544 F2d 162 (4th Cir 1976);
Gay Students Organization v Bonner, 509 F2d 652 (1st Cir 1974).
" Healy, 408 US at 189. Accord Tinker v Des Moines Community School Dist., holding
student actions may be prohibited if they "materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school." 393 US 503, 513 (1969), and suggesting the power to prohibit
student actions is not limited to criminal actions. Accord Widmar v Vincent, "we affirm the
continuing validity of cases, e.g. Healy v James that recognize a university's right to exclude
even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." 454 US 253, 277 (1981)
(citation omitted). Note further that this same reasoning suggests that recognition, once
extended, may be repealed if students fall to respect campus rules. See Healy, 408 US at
194.
", Widmar, 454 US at 268 n 5.
6
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Assuming that any regulations University X places upon student
groups are reasonable, and that the purpose of the regulations is
consistent with University X's mission to educate its student body,
University X may decline to recognize a student group that has
indicated, perhaps by past performance or express declaration," 6
that it will violate university regulations.5
University X may also enforce compliance with rules that
might not be considered reasonable in other public fora, thus allowing the University greater discretion in regulating public speech
than other state actors in other fora. Then Associate Justice Rehnquist seized upon this reasoning in his Healy concurrence, asserting that "[t]he government as employer or school administrator
may impose upon employees and students reasonable regulations
that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon
5' 8
all citizens.
Given that a university has some discretion to recognize student groups, the question becomes how much discretion. The answer appears to be very little: only that which can be justified by
the need for reasonable rules consistent with the educational mission. These reasonable rules apparently may exceed the scope of
mere time, place or manner restrictions. This answer, while speculative because the issue has not been litigated in federal court, is
plainly consistent with the Court's language in Healy and Widmar.
B. The Funding Paradigm
In the second hypothetical, a student group seeks funding
from University X. The pivotal difference between the recognition
and funding situations is that while recognition is not a scarce resource, funding is." When the Supreme Court expanded the right

' Note that the Students for Democratic Society, held to have been unjustly denied
recognition in Healy, did not expressly threaten to break campus rules. The group merely
refused to speculate on their future behavior, and had no past history on that campus.
Healy, 408 US at 173-75.
One might argue that the language in Healy was simply meant to be a time, place or
manner regulation, keeping within the strict confines of the forum doctrine. A broader reading, however, seems more consistent with the subsequent "unique educational mission" language in Widmar. Since a university has some discretion to prescribe what constitutes an
education, it consequently maintains discretion in deciding what substantially interferes
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. Such discretion is inconsistent with mere time, place and manner rules. See Saia v New York, 334 US 558, 562 (1948).
" Healy, 408 US at 203 (Rehnquist concurring).
" The availability of funding was a key factor in the Eighth Circuit's decision in GLSA,
850 F2d 361. The GLSA court seemed to agree with the District Court that "resource constraints necessarily impose some limit," id at 366, but concluded that because excess funds
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to recognition in Healy, it specifically declined to decide whether a
student group has a right to funding.6 Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit held: "There is no affirmative commandment upon the University to activate [a student group's] exercise of First Amendment
guarantees; the only commandment is not to infringe [upon] their
enjoyment."'" Since the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on
the situation in the funding paradigm, one must argue by analogy
from three Court of Appeals cases that raise the issue.
In the first case, Galda v Rutgers,62 the Third Circuit used the
forum doctrine to analyze university discretion in funding student
organizations. In the second case, Student Gov't Ass'n v University of Massachusetts,3 the First Circuit used subsidy analysis to
analyze a similar situation. These two courts applied different
analyses but reached a similar conclusion: a university does not
have to fund all recognized student groups. In the third case, Gay
and Lesbian Students Ass'n v Gohn,e" the Eighth Circuit did not
expressly apply forum or subsidy analysis, but concluded that a
university may not deny funding to a student group for viewpointbased reasons, especially when sufficient student activity funds are
available.
1. Funding under the forum doctrine.
Galda questioned the constitutionality of a university's imposing mandatory student fees to fund the New Jersey Public Interest
Research Group ("NJ PIRG"). The Galda court held that a university may compel students to pay mandatory fees to fund only
those forms of student speech that have a primarily educational
function, and that accommodate diverse ideological viewpoints.
The Galda court attempted to find a practical, legal limit to.
the strict nondiscrimination requirements of the forum doctrine.

remained in the student activities budget at the end of the year, and no other qualified
student group had been denied money, a lack of funds could not have been the university's
true motive for denying funding to its Gay and Lesbian Students Association. Id at 367.
"

"It is unclear

. . .

whether recognition also carries with it a right to seek funds from

the student budget.. . . The first District Court opinion. . . states flatly that '[r]ecognition
does not thereby entitle an organization to college financial support.'. . . [Riecognition only
entitles a group to apply for funds. . . . [W]e do not consider possible funding as an associ" Healy u James, 408 US 169, 182 n 8 (1972) (citation
ational aspect of nonrecognition ...
omitted).
6 Maryland Public Interest Research Group u Elkins, 565 F2d 864, 866 (1977).
62 772 F2d 1060 (3d Cir 1985), cert denied, 475 US 1065 (1986).
6' 868 F2d 473 (1st Cir 1989).
850 F2d 361.
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Students sued, contending that the mandatory fee 65 imposed on
them for the purpose of supporting an organization whose political
viewse" they opposed was an infringement on their First Amendment rights, particularly their freedom of association. 7 In GaIda,
NJ PIRG was recognized by, and received funds from, Rutgers;
students sued to exclude NJ PIRG from the university forum. The
court held that "because the educational component is only incidental to the organization's ideological objectives, the educational
benefits are not adequate to overcome the constitutional objections." ' Plaintiffs showed NJ PIRG had insufficient educational
value to justify infringing upon their associational rights by forcing
them to fund it.
Galda is important because it demonstrates a successful methodology for taking advantage of the discretionary exception to
which the Supreme Court had only alluded, in the recognition
cases. GaIda gives state actors such as University X a framework
in which to approach allocation decisions. This framework functions as follows.
First, student groups enjoy a presumption of inclusion within
the forum. 9 To rebut the initial presumption, the student plaintiffs in Galda successfully argued that NJ PIRG had only an inci66

Each student was assessed $3.50 per semester which went directly to NJ PIRG. After

payment, the student could request a refund, but the court found the refund system inadequate since payment was required first, and the refunds took up to a year to arrive. Galda,
772 F2d at 1062.
In Galda, students objected to being assessed mandatory student fees which were
given directly to NJ PIRG. PIRG is politically nonpartisan, but participates in state legislative matters and actively engages in research, lobbying and advocacy for social change.
PIRG has lobbied for the Equal Rights Amendment, a nuclear weapons freeze, and a number of other consumer and environmental issues. Id at 1061.
" Note that the Galda court relied heavily on the reasoning in Abood v Detroit Bd. of
Educ., which held that a person may not be legally compelled "to contribute to the support
of an ideological cause he may oppose . . . ." 431 US 209, 235 (1977). The Court in Abood
ruled that a union may not use mandatory dues required of teachers by law to fund political
speech substantially unrelated to the union's core purpose or mission.
*n Galda, 772 F2d at 1061.
6 While Galda does not expressly allocate the burden of proof, it notes that 'considerable deference' should be accorded the university's judgment." Id at 1064, citing Galda v
Bloustein, 686 F2d 159 (3d Cir 1982) ("Galda I"). Upon first reading this deference may
appear to give a preliminary presumption to the university decision itself in exercise of its
discretion, but this reading is inconsistent with Healy, in which the university was expressly
given the burden of proof upon exclusion of a student group.
Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v Gohn goes further to suggest a presumption of an
equal right to funding as other groups if all technical funding requirements are met and
funds are available. 850 F2d 361 (8th Cir 1988).
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dental relation to the university's educational mission7" and thus
overcame the initial presumption for inclusion.7
Second, once the presumption for inclusion is rebutted, the
court must balance the conflicting -interests presented.72 In Galda,
once the students presented a prima facie case for exclusion, the
court "left open the possibility that the University might demonstrate a compelling state interest [justifying inclusion] by establishing the importance of [NJ] PIRG's 'contribution to the university forum.' ,,73 In the fee context, "[t]he University shoulders a

heavy burden to justify its determination to levy the assessment.

717

The court sought arguments for inclusion based on the

educational value of NJ PIRG's speech.
The educational value of speech is, of course, difficult to isolate and quantify. 75 Galda is unique in that the court overruled the
university's assessment of NJ PIRG as a high value educational
contributor to its forum. The court found grounds to do so because
of the semi-independent and primarily political nature of NJ
PIRG. A court is unlikely to overrule a university's evaluation of
the educational content of a group composed- strictly of students
70 The Galda court stated "In order to 'overcome the presumptive validity of the university's judgment' [that an organization should be included within the forum], plaintiffs
must establish that [the organization] . . . (has] only an incidental educational component."
Galda, 772 F2d at 1064-65, citing Galda 1, 686 F2d at 166.
7' Galda, 772 F2d at 1066-68. In GLSA, 850 F2d 361, the Eighth Circuit overruled the
University of Arkansas's denial of funding to the Gay and Lesbian Students Association.
The GLSA alleged that it was denied funds because of its viewpoint, in violation of the First
Amendment. The facts clearly supported GLSA's claim that the university's motive for denying funds was viewpoint-based. Evidence of this included transcripts of the debate over
the funding request, as well as an attempt to pass a rule prohibiting funding to all groups
organized around sexual preference-of which GLSA was the only one.
The Eighth Circuit in GLSA rejected the University of Arkansas's argument that the
funding denial was based on the GLSA's lack of educational content, not because such an
argument would fail, but because the lack of educational content rationale had never previously been advanced before the university got to court, while viewpoint-based objections
clearly were. GLSA, 830 F2d at 367. Thus, the GLSA court did not deny that a university
may base a funding exclusion on lack of educational content, an argument the Galda court
accepted, it simply rejected that argument because it did not fit with the facts of GLSA.
"[Tihe university is free to counter the plaintiff's showing or to otherwise demonstrate a compelling state interest by establishing the importance of the challenged group's
contribution to the university forum." Galda, 772 F2d at 1064.

Id at 1066, quoting Galda I.
7' Id. See also Elrod v Burns 427 US 347, 363 (1976); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 25
(1976).
." Id at 1062-63. Indeed, this definitional problem is one reason the courts prefer to
defer to university expertise in educational matters.
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whose activities focused solely on the university itself.76 By seizing
on the lack of educational content of NJ PIRG as a basis for exclusion, however, the Galda court uses the door left open in Healy
and Widmar that supports a narrow, content-based exercise of discretion in regulating student speech based on the university's
unique educational function." Galda holds that University X may
be able to exclude a student group from its forum based on that
78
group's lack of educational content.
The analysis in the funding context appears consistent with
that in the recognition context. In both paradigms, University X
faces a high standard of scrutiny and burden of proof in order to
exclude the student group. The difference in the funding paradigm
appears to be that the allowable exercise of discretion has been
further developed out of necessity; since funds are a scarce resource, their allocation is more likely to be questioned by the
group that has to pay.
2. Funding under the subsidy doctrine.
Whereas Galda analyzed university discretion in funding student groups under the forum doctrine, Student Gov't Ass'n v University of Massachusetts7e analyzed such discretion using the subsidy doctrine. Student Gov't Ass'n was the first decision to apply
subsidy reasoning expressly to university funding of student
groups, pinpointing the line between illegally imposing a discriminatory penalty, such as denying recognition and legally withholding an optional subsidy, such as funding. The Student Gov't Ass'n
court relied upon the Supreme Court's subsidy cases to reach its
conclusion that the University of Massachusetts was not obligated
to continue funding the litigation activities of its Legal Services
Office ("LSO").80 Student Gov't Ass'n is useful for the funding
76 The GLSA result supports this conclusion. The GLSA can be distinguished from NJ
PIRG in Galda, because the GLSA focused its activities on the campus and student body,
while NJ PIRG focused on political lobbying off of the campus.
77 Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 268 n 5 (1981).
7 Note, however, that the decision in GaIda shows that university discretion to evaluate educational content of student groups is not complete; the courts will overrule a university's estimation of educational value if it cannot be proven accurate. Such activism by the
courts is rare, however, and seems only to have occurred in Galda because another First
Amendment right, the students' freedom of association, was at stake. In sum, a university
may exercise some discretion in making funding decisions based upon its estimation of a
group's educational content, but must be able to justify its conclusions if called to do so in
court.
T' 868 F2d 473 (1st Cir 1989).
'o The court cites the "subsidy cases" in reaching its holding in Student Gov't Ass'n.
See note 28.
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paradigm because the plaintiff relied on the forum doctrine for its
argument, 1 and because the First Circuit resorted to strained reasoning to conclude that the LSO was not a forum."2
The University of Massachusetts ceased funding the litigation
activities of its LSO, which represented students, but continued to
fund the LSO's other legal services, including counseling. Three
students then sued the University for allegedly violating their First
Amendment right to speak freely. The First Circuit followed the
reasoning of TWR83 and concluded that the University of Massachusetts had no obligation to subsidize student speech by continuing to fund the LSO's litigation activity.
Student Gov't Ass'n held that the LSO neither constituted
nor was part of a forum, obviating any need to apply the forum
doctrine. The court declared that the university's support of the
LSO constituted a speech subsidy and thus was not required under
the Constitution. The court allowed the University to discontinue
that part of the LSO's funding used for litigation.
Following the TWR framework, the Student Gov't Ass'n court
began by asserting the conclusion reached in Cammarano v United
States84 that the state does not violate a student's First Amendment rights if it refuses to subsidize student activities which are
protected by the First Amendment.8 5 Next, the court demon-

strated the University's compliance with the two TWR caveats. By
stopping LSO funding, the University did not infringe upon the
students' right to litigate and obtain legal counsel.88 Counseling remained available through the LSO, and students were in no way
penalized if they chose to litigate independently. 7
Also, the First Circuit held that the University's actions were
constitutional because litigation funding was not stopped for the
purpose of discriminating against any one viewpoint. The stopfunding order affected all student litigation equally, regardless of
"I 868 F2d at 476.
" The Student Gov't Ass'n court is not alone in having trouble distinguishing between
forum doctrine and the subsidy cases in the student funding context. Comment, 55 U Chi L
Rev at 382-88 (cited in note 16), notes that a discussion of the constitutionality of
mandatory student fees and university funding of student groups requires reference to both

the forum and subsidy cases.
83 461 US 540 (1983).
358 US 498 (1959).
" Student Gov't Ass'n, 868 F2d at 479.
" Id.

8 Id.
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the subject of the litigation." Accordingly, the effect was considered sufficiently viewpoint-neutral to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Thus, the court in Student Gov't Ass'n used the subsidy
doctrine to allow the University of Massachusetts to consider content-based criteria but not viewpoint-based criteria in making a
funding decision."
The Eighth Circuit in GLSA 90 expressly declined to apply subsidy analysis to a student funding case in the way the First Circuit
did. The Eighth Circuit did not decide that subsidy analysis was
inapplicable per se, but merely declined to apply it because the
facts of GLSA showed viewpoint discrimination that neither forum
nor subsidy analysis would condone." In GLSA, a Gay and Lesbian Students Association was denied university funding. The record showed that the debate over the funding request had focused
on GLSA's viewpoint, that some voters "freely admitted they
voted against the group because of its views,""2 and that "University officials were feeling pressure from state legislators not to fund
the GLSA or to allow in any way the dissemination of opinions
tolerant towards homosexuals."9 3 The GLSA court did, however,
agree with the subsidy cases in principle."' It went on to echo the
content/viewpoint distinction in its own words: "Conduct may be
prohibited or regulated within broad limits. But government may
not discriminate against people because it dislikes their ideas."9'
GLSA thus leaves open the possibility of a successful subsidybased argument for denial of funds in cases such as Galda, in
which viewpoint discrimination is not apparent.
" The court noted that "the withdrawal of the subsidy is not framed in an invidiously
discriminatory manner that is designed to suppress dangerous ideas. The ... order applies
to all litigation ...

not just litigation advocating liberal or conservative causes.. . . Nor is

there any indication that the Board's ... order was aimed at the suppression of student
suits against either third parties or the University." Id at 479-80 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
" Student Gov't Ass'n, 868 F2d at 482.
90 850 F2d 361 (8th Cir 1988).
" The GLSA court concluded that "[b]ecause .we believe the record is replete with evidence that the Senate's action was based on viewpoint discrimination, we reverse." Id at
366. The court acknowledged the University of Arkansas's subsidy arguments, but found
them inadequate in the face of clear viewpoint-based discrimination. Id. To support its conclusion that viewpoint discrimination is not allowed in funding cases, the Eighth Circuit
cited Justice Rehnquist's caveat in TWR that "[t]he case would be different if Congress
were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to '[aim] at the suppression
of dangerous ideas."' Id at 367, citing TWR, 461 US at 548 (citations omitted).
9 850 F2d at 367.
9" Id.

" Id at 366.
" Id at 368.
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3. Different means to the same end.
As discussed above, the forum and subsidy analyses are compatible in the context of university support of student speech because of the discretion allowed universities in recognition of their
unique educational mission. The availability of this discretion can
be said to lower slightly the level of scrutiny to which university
funding decisions are subject when compared to those of more
traditional public forums designed to benefit the public at large.
Galda shows a court working within the confines of the forum
doctrine to limit university funding obligations, while Student
Gov't Ass'n shows a court applying the subsidy doctrine to achieve
a similar result. University X could cite either or both arguments
to support a decision not to fund a student group.
A counter argument is that
Widmar and Healy can be read to indicate that a university may not exclude certain groups from university
funding because of what those groups intend to say. Just
as the first amendment prohibits selective exclusions
from the use of theforum's facilities, it also prohibits selective exclusions from the funding process because many
student groups need university funds to compete effectively in the marketplace of ideas."e
However, this argument conflicts with the subsidy reasoning in
McRae, Cammarano, and their progeny (including TWR) that the
state need not subsidize First Amendment rights. This counter argument faces obvious practical limitations as well. University coffers are not bottomless, and costs accrued are largely passed on to
students in the form of increased tuition and mandatory fees.
Many students can ill afford compelled funding of others' speech.
Furthermore, if a university is required to fund all student groups,
the resulting dilution in its funds may result in each group receiving a meaninglessly small amount of funds. Finally, the suggestion
that the courts can and should command a university to fund all
student groups runs contrary to the Supreme Court's history of
granting limited discretion to educational institutions to manage
their own educational matters.9 7
Comment, 55 U Chi L Rev at 385 (cited in note 16).
For example, broad discretion within the confines of the First Amendment is routinely accorded local school officials on curricular decisions and daily management of school
affairs. For a more detailed discussion of curricular discretion, see Board of Educ. v Pico,
457 US 853 (1982).
7
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CONCLUSION

Despite its status as a public forum, a university may consider
some content-based criteria in regulating student, speech. University officials enjoy greater autonomy than regulators of a general
function forum in deciding what speech they will support. Just
how much discretion courts will grant university decisions regulating student speech is unclear, but the cases discussed herein suggest some narrow parameters. In a situation such as the recognition paradigm, it is clear that a university may not deny a student
organization the right to recognition and its associated privileges
without demonstrating a compelling state interest, such as the enforcement of reasonable campus rules compatible with its educational mission. This leaves a university only limited discretion in
choosing which rules best suit its educational mission.
In a situation such as the funding paradigm, however, university discretion to consider content-based criteria increases. When
allocating scarce resources, university content-based discrimination
standards under the forum doctrine relax to the extent that they
overlap and become coextensive with the subsidy doctrine's less
rigorous, nondiscrimination viewpoint standards. This allows a
university to consider content-based criteria in making funding decisions that it may not consider in making recognition decisions.
Similarly, the Supreme Court generally recognizes that, to some
extent, state funding decisions necessarily rest on the subject matter of the request. 8
The question of how the state may distribute scarce resources
in a nondiscriminatory manner consistent with the First Amendment is raised constantly, from the funding decisions of the National Endowment for the Arts to the university funding decisions.
The reasoning of the subsidy doctrine reinforces the conclusion
that a narrowly limited exercise of discretion, consistent with a
university's unique educational mission, allows university officials
to consider educational, content-based criteria in making funding
decisions without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

" In Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), the Supreme Court entertained an analogous
discussion on public funding of the arts and suggested that a funding decision can rest on
the artistic value of the subject matter itself. Furthermore, in Maher v Roe, 432 US 464

(1977), the Court held that withholding state funds from abortion related services did not
violate the proposed recipient organization's right to free speech and did not constitute objectionable content-based discrimination.

